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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the relationships between governance characteristics of non-
profit organizations (NPOs) (CEO duality and board size) and their performance, considered as 
their ability to collect financial resources. The study is conducted on a sample of 200 UK registered 
charities that work in a context characterized by a medium to high level of “mandatory” 
accountability. With a regression analysis we verify strong positive relationships between the 
NPOs’ financial performance and the CEO duality and board size. Further analyses show that if the 
charities increase their level of accountability through the use of additional voluntary disclosure 
mechanisms and tools such as the use of social networks, these relationships are confirmed. 
Qualitative characteristics of governance and voluntary accountability of UK charities are also 
analysed in association with some classes of revenues using the logistic regression method and the 
multiple correspondence analysis. 
 












The governance of not-for-profit, charitable organisations has recently attracted much attention 
from the public, governments and regulatory bodies in the UK and elsewhere. Similar to what has 
been witnessed in the corporate world, charities have come under scrutiny for high levels of 
executive pay (NCVO, 2014), allegations of mis-management and misconduct (Sussex, 2015), and 
un-ethical fundraising tactics (Jenkin, 2016). As a result, more and more emphasis has been placed 
on the role of board of trustees in ensuring that charities are well governed and accountable to their 
various constituent groups. Yet, despite the proliferation of ‘good practice’ guidelines for 
governance (both in the corporate and not-for-profit sector), there remains much theoretical 
controversy about the nature of optimal governance mechanisms and the empirical evidence base is 
far from clear-cut (Dalton et al., 1998; Hambrick et al., 2008). In the context of non-profit boards, 
Hyndman & McDonnell (2009) identified a research agenda for to gain a better understanding of 
governance in charities, which includes questions around the role and composition of boards. 
This paper contributes to this emergent research agenda by analysing the relationship between 
board characteristics of Non-Profit Organizations (NPOs) and their organizational performance in a 
context characterized by a medium-high level of accountability. We focus on two board 
characteristics – CEO duality (when the CEO and the board chair are the same person) and board 
size. CEO duality was chosen because it is a contested concept, both theoretically and empirically. 
On the one hand, agency theory recommends that the positions of CEO and chair are held by 
separate individuals in order to limit CEO power and increase board independence (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Rechner & Dalton, 1991), whereas stewardship theory recommends duality in order to 
empower managers and provide unity of leadership (Donaldson & Davis, 1991). The empirical 
evidence, however, seems to suggest that whether or not CEO duality affects firm performance is 
highly context-specific (Boyd, 1995), and as such interesting to explore in the context of NPOs. 
Similarly when it comes to board size in charities, there are theoretical arguments both for and 
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against large boards and there may be important contingencies affecting this relationship (Hyndman 
& McDonnell, 2009). The contingency we are particularly interested in is the level of 
accountability, that is the extent to which the charities chose voluntary disclosure mechanisms 
above and beyond those mandated by the regulator.  
The analysis was conducted on a random sample of 200 UK charities taken from the Charity 
Commission Register. The United Kingdom, in particular, England and Wales, was chosen as the 
empirical setting for two reasons. First, as already mentioned, governance in the charity sector in 
the UK, and especially the role of boards, has recently come under much public scrutiny (House of 
Commons, 2016). This has happened in the context of a national conservative-led economic 
austerity programme, which has simultaneously increased the demand for services provided by 
many NPOs and negatively affected revenues of charities (Bridle, 2012). Second, the charity sector 
in the UK is characterised by a medium-to-high level of regulation and mandatory accountability 
required for organizations registered with the Charity Commission. As such, there are already 
mechanisms in place to mitigate the agency problem vis-à-vis information asymmetries and 
facilitating the monitoring and control role of board members (trustees). The analysis proceeds in 
two steps. In the first phase we aim to verify how CEO duality and board size are related to 
organizational performance (assessed by the level of total revenues achieved in the fiscal year) in 
charities with a medium-high level of mandatory accountability (as required by the Charity 
Commission). Next, we explore how the relations found in the previous phase change if the charity 
increases its level of accountability through mechanisms of voluntary disclosure such as the 
publication of information on volunteers, the use of social networks and the declared use of a 
strategic plan. The paper is structured as follows: in the first part we give a brief overview of the 
literature on the topic of accountability followed by an examination of the theoretical rationale 
linking CEO duality and board size to organisational performance and associated hypotheses.  The 
second part focuses on the UK (England & Wales) not-for-profit context and explains the reasons 
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why we consider the England & Wales regulator model for charities as an example of good practice 
in managing the accountability of NPOs. The third part explains the methods and the analysis to 
verify (or reject) the hypotheses, and this is followed by the discussion of the results and the 
conclusions. 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The topic of accountability of NPOs is a central theme that many authors have explored and 
analysed in the past and present literature of non-profit governance (Cavill & Sohail, 2007; 
Connolly et al., 2013; Schedler, 1999). Non-profit organizations’ revenues are derived mainly from 
contributions from government and the general public. These funds, which may be generated 
through contractual or non-contractual means, are subsequently used to serve group(s) of 
beneficiaries directly or indirectly. Thus, the ability to create trust and confidence is intrinsic to the 
nature of NPOs and can be fostered by being accountable to stakeholders (Gibelman and Gelman, 
2001). However, there is no single agreed definition of what constitutes “accountability”. The lack 
of a common view of what accountability means in the non-profit sector is highlighted also by 
Cnaan (1996) in his commentary for the special issue of Non-profit Management and Leadership on 
this very same theme. Diana Leat (1990) argued that the vagaries surrounding the concept impact 
our ability to discuss and advance knowledge in this field. Worth defines accountability as “being 
required to answer, to take responsibility, for one’s actions” (Worth, 2009).  But he goes on to argue 
that this concept should not be interpreted as merely following the requirements of the law and that 
“accountability needs to include more than just avoiding transgressions and exhibiting model 
behaviour. It may need to encompass demonstrated effectiveness in achieving the purposes for 
which the non-profit exists. That requires not only that the resources entrusted to the NPO not be 
misused, but also that they be used to maximum benefit in pursuing the organization’s mission” 
(Worth, 2009, p.). Anheier (2005) affirms that “in contrast to businesses, which are ultimately about 
financial profit, non-profit governance and management are ultimately about the organization’s 
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mission”. In that sense, the adoption by NPOs of “social accountability” instruments, such as social 
and mission reports or the use of social-networks, is as pertinent as the use of standard financial 
accounting tools in profit-driven organisations.  
In examining what is “accountability” and how it is manifested in for-profit and not-for profit 
organizations, authors have focused on different aspects and levels. Behn et al (2010) focus on 
voluntary financial disclosure of US non-profit organizations, developing and testing a model based 
on several studies on for-profit disclosure. Indeed, even though the goals of non-profit organizations 
are social in nature, economic and financial efficiency and issues related to control are essential in 
the non-profit sector too.  Behn et al. (2010) find that “if a non-profit has more debt, a larger 
contribution ratio, a higher compensation expense ratio, and/or is a larger organization in the higher 
education segment, it is more likely to provide its audited financial statements”. Keating and 
Frumkin (2003) examine the financial accountability of non-profit organization present seven 
recommendations to enhance non-profit accounting and reporting, such as “developing active 
boards and organizations that rely on strategic plans and budgets to improve organizational 
performance and accountability”. They further highlight the importance of accounting that goes 
beyond financial results:  “Encouraging more extensive disclosure of a program’s rationale, inputs 
(names of donors and number of employees and volunteers), and outputs (number of clients served 
and hours of service delivered) would be a useful step”. Ebrahim (2010), focusing on “the many 
faces of non-profit accountability”, highlights that issues related to accountability involve “deciding 
both to whom and for what” the NPO is accountable.  He views accountability as a “relational 
concept” that “varies according to the relationships among actors” (Ebrahim, 2010) and that 
therefore “the characteristics of accountability necessarily vary with NGO type” (Ebrahim, 2003). 
In addition, the organization should be accountable not only in relation to financial results, but also  
governance, performance and organizational mission. He identifies five broad mechanisms that can 
be classified as “tools” and/or “processes”: reports and disclosure statements (tool), performance 
7 
 
assessments and evaluations (tool), participation (process), self-regulation (process), and social 
audits (tool and process) (Ebrahim, 2003). Cavill and Sohail (2007) identify two categories of 
accountability, practical and strategic, and elaborate the characteristics of the two typologies. 
Building on the above, we adopt a broad conceptualisation of accountability in NPOs as the degree 
of transparency and openness, as the level of disclosure and answerability (Schedler, 1999) by 
members who govern the organization and as a mechanism of governance that can lead the 
organization towards better performance. We argue that the relationship between a high level of 
accountability and the increase in organizational performance can be explained due to reductions in 
information asymmetry between NPO’s management, its board and stakeholders (donors and 
beneficiaries), which will inter alia strengthen board governance by giving the trustees more 
information (reports, documents, etc.) to assess the activities of the Top Management Team (TMT) 
against the mission of the NPO. We next turn to the role of boards and how board characteristics 
may influence organisational performance in the context of medium-to-high levels of 
accountability.  
Boards of directors or trustees are considered to be at the apex of an organisation’s internal 
governance system (Fama & Jensen, 1983). As such, they are expected to fulfil two broad roles – to 
monitor and control management, and to provide advice and strategic direction (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). Agency theory underpins the board’s monitoring and control 
task since under conditions of separation of ownership and control, and assuming managers (agents) 
are inclined to pursue actions that are contrary to the interests of principals (shareholders, donors), 
there is a need for a governance mechanism such as the board to curb self-seeking behaviours and 
control the actions of the agent (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Whilst boards’ 
involvement in monitoring and control can prevent value-destruction in the organisation, a range of 
other theories focus more specifically on how boards can create value. Resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1987; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), strategic choice theory (Judge & Zeithaml, 
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1992), stewardship theory (Davis et al., 1997; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003) and stakeholder 
theory (van Puyvelde et al., 2012; Wang & Dewhirst, 1992) have been drawn upon to explain how 
boards contribute resources, provide advice and strategic direction, as well as legitimating the 
organisation in its external environment.  The question that scholars have then sought to address is 
which board characteristics are most likely to influence boards’ ability to perform these different 
roles. We turn to examine two such characteristics – CEO duality and board size. 
The question of whether the CEO should also act as the chair of the board in both corporate and 
non-profit organisations has attracted much scholarly and practitioner interest (Bradshaw et al, 
1998; Fama and Jensen, 1983; Brickley et al, 1997; Peni, 2014; Baliga et al, 1996; Dalton et al, 
1998; Dalton and Dalton, 2011; Cornforth, 2001; Elsayed, 2007; Adams et al., 2008; Callen et al. 
2003; Miller-Millesen, 2003). According to agency theory, the roles should be held by separate 
individuals in order to avoid CEO entrenchment and power (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Lorsch and 
MacIver, 1989), and to prevent compromising the board’s monitoring and control role (the same 
individual being both the monitor and the one being monitored). In contrast, stewardship and 
resource dependence theorists advocate duality as it empowers managers and promotes unity of 
command at the top of the organisational hierarchy (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991), 
which can lead to speedier and more incisive decision-making in the context of environmental 
uncertainties (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Yet, the empirical evidence in support of either 
perspective is rather ambiguous (Krause et al. 2014), and one explanation for this may be found in 
the insufficient attention to the complementarities of governance mechanisms and contextual 
variables.  Early research by Boyd (1991), for example, showed that CEO duality can be beneficial 
for firm performance in high complexity environments, since under such conditions strong 
leadership and decision-speed outweigh the disadvantages of CEO power. More recent research has 
focused on the notion of governance bundles (Aguilera et al., 2008; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; 
Schiehll et al., 2014), and the extent to which different governance mechanisms, such as CEO 
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duality, board independence and external control are complementary or substitute each other. The 
context of UK charities may be described as highly complex and uncertain due to changing funding 
regimes (Bridle, 2012), the delicate line between market and social orientation that charities tread 
(Seymour et al. 2006), and the intricacies of donor relations and motivations (Hyndman & 
McDonnell, 2009). Alongside that, as we discussed earlier, the UK charity sector is characterised by 
a medium-to-high level of accountability, and regulated by an outside body, the UK Charity 
Commission. The trustees of boards are akin to non-executive directors in the corporate world, and 
take up the majority of board seats (Grant Thornton, 2013). Under similar
1
 conditions, Misangyi 
and Acharya (2014) showed that CEO duality can be beneficial for firm performance. Based on 
these arguments of environmental complexity and supplementarity within governance bundles, we 
hypothesise that:  
H1: CEO duality has a positive impact on the organizational performance (measured as its 
ability to collect resources, i.e. total revenues), in a context characterized by a medium-high 
level of accountability. 
What constitutes an optimal board size? Scholars have tried to answer this question using a variety 
of theoretical lenses. The argument from agency scholars is that smaller boards are preferable to 
large ones as the latter are too unwieldy, may create free-rider problems amongst non-executives 
and thus generally promote managerial entrenchment (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993).  
Proponents of resource dependence theory, on the other hand, stress the importance of boards on 
procuring external resources and mitigating sources of uncertainty in the external environment 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Following that logic, larger boards are advantageous compared to 
smaller ones, especially in the context of highly complex and uncertain environments. Dalton et al. 
(1999) in their meta-analysis of board size and firm performance provide empirical support in 
favour of increased board size. For non-profit boards, the resource dependence arguments have 
                                                          
1
 Their research was in a corporate setting and measured the market for external control rather than external 
regulation as we would find in the charity sector. 
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been further supplemented by a stakeholder theory logic (Bai, 2013; Cornforth, 2003; Hyndman & 
McDonnell, 2009) that argues for the need to have a wide stakeholder representation on boards to 
ensure their voice and enhance organisational legitimacy. Bai (2013), for example, showed that 
social performance of non-profit hospitals is greater when there are larger boards, whereas the 
opposite relationship holds when the hospital is for-profit. We therefore propose that: 
H2: Increasing board size has a positive impact on the organizational performance 
(measured as its ability in collecting resources, i.e. total revenues), in a context characterized 
by a medium-high level of accountability.  
MANDATORY AND VOLUNTARY ACCOUNTABILITY IN UK CHARITIES 
As previously stated, the aim of this study is to understand how mechanisms of accountability can 
indirectly affect the organizational performance, by increasing or mitigating the relationship 
between board characteristics (CEO duality and board size) and the ability of the organization to 
collect resources. Our analysis is conducted on a sample of 200 registered charities present on the 
Charity Commission’s Register. The choice fell on the United Kingdom, in particular England & 
Wales, because it can be considered a good practice example in relation to the regulation and level 
of mandatory accountability required for organizations registered at the Charity Commission. The  
UK has three different bodies that are in charge of controlling and regulating UK charities: the 
"Charity Commission" which registers and regulates charities in England and Wales, the "Charity 
Commission for Northern Ireland" that deals with regulating charities in Northern Ireland and the 
"Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (OSCR)", an independent body that deals with the control 
and regulation of Scottish charities. A key element that makes the charities in England & Wales 
particularly “accountable” compared to the NPOs of some other countries, is that in England & 
Wales the status of charity is not a legal form by which an organization is constituted, it is a status 
that the organization acquires if it can demonstrate to the regulator that it carries out its activities 
and uses its available resources for a “charitable purpose” and for the “public benefit”. This is one 
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of the main reasons that has led some authors to consider the United Kingdom one of the best 
countries in term of regulation and accountability of non-profit organizations (Irvine & Ryan, 
2010). In the United Kingdom, the word used to identify the organizations that operate in the non-
profit sector is “charity”, a concept that is closely connected with the organisational inception 
having a  “charitable purpose”. Anheier and Regina (2005) affirm that “in countries like the UK and 
Australia, a charity is essentially an instrument for carrying out the purpose of a charitable trust”, 
and go on to explain that  “Charity is an English common law concept that identifies a class of non-
profit organization by purpose”.  
The Charity Commission as the independent regulator for charities in England & Wales also 
manages different information that charities (with some exemptions related to their size) have to 
submit.  Table 1 below summarizes the documents charities have to submit according to their 
income brackets. 
 
Table 1. Due documents for financial periods ending on or after 1 April 2009 






















£10k or less Yes - - - - No 
£10-£25k - Yes - - - No 
£25k - £500k - Yes Yes - - Yes 
£500k - £1m - Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
Greater than 
£1m 
- Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Source: Charity Commission website  
 
Each charity must give some information to the Charity Commission, and the level and complexity 
of the information depends on its income.  
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In addition to the mandatory reporting requitements, charities can also provide further voluntary 
information, using different tools and mechanisms such as communications using an institutional 
website and social networks (blogs, fora, facebook, twitter, etc.), institutional reports that contain 
information about volunteers, communication of information about the strategic plan in order to 
inform the public about their mission, objectives, and future activities. The use of these tools of 
voluntary disclosure can increase the organization’s ability to collect resources making it still more 
accountable. For example, the results of a study conducted by Saxton et al (2014) “indicate a 
positive relationship between the level of charitable contributions and the amount of disclosure 
provided by an organization on its website” (Saxton et al, 2014). Greenberg and Macaulay (2009) 
suggest that “NPOs should be leaders in using social technologies to grow and strengthen their 
networks. These are, after all, relationship-driven organizations: online communities and social 
media offer a new way of harnessing existing loyalty and passion” even if the data reported in their 
study indicate that this potential remains mostly unused (Greenberg and Macaulay, 2009). Waters et 
al. (2009) affirm that “Social networking sites can be an effective way to reach stakeholder groups 
if organizations understand how their stakeholders use the sites. Results from this study show that 
non-profits are beginning to experiment with different Facebook offerings”. The regular collection 
of information on volunteer involvement, the annual measurement of volunteer impact, and the 
supervision and communication with volunteers are some of the recommended practices for 
volunteer management (Hager & Brudney, 2004). Also the use of a strategic plan is considered to 
be good practice for NPOs since it represents a useful tool for organizations in designing their 
futures, setting their goals and deciding on the strategies, actions and resources to achieve them. 
The Charity Commission recommends that trustees of larger organizations “take responsibility for 
setting the charity’s strategic aims and direction, and agreeing appropriate future plans”, they 
should also “periodically review what the charity is achieving, and how effective the charity’s 
activities are” (Charity Commission Guidance). Green and Griesinger (1996) find that the “boards 
of effective organizations tended to be more fully involved in policy formation, strategic planning, 
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program review, board development, resource development, financial planning and control, and 
dispute resolution than were boards of less effective organizations” (Green and Griesinger, 1996). 
We argue that the publication of information on volunteers, the declared use of a strategic plan and 
the presence of social networks are tools of voluntary disclosure that strengthen the positive effects 
of the mechanisms of mandatory accountability. In essence, the potential for agency problems is 
substantially diminished if there are additional mechanisms which allow stakeholders (users, donors 
and the regulator) to hold the organisation to account.   We predict a positive impact of the use of 
these tools on the organizational performance: 
H3: The introduction of  tools of voluntary disclosure has a positive impact on the 
organizational performance (measured as its ability in collecting resources, i.e. total 
revenues), increasing the strength of the mechanisms of mandatory accountability. 
Specifically, we propose that: 
H3(a): The publication of information on volunteers on the charity’s website or reports has a 
positive impact on the organizational performance (total revenues). 
H3(b): The use of social networks (forum, blogs, facebook, twitter, etc.) has a positive impact 
on the organizational performance (total revenues). 
H3(c): The declared use of a strategic plan has a positive impact on the organizational 
performance (total revenues). 
METHODS AND SAMPLE 
Our analysis was conducted on a sample of 200 charities selected randomly from the Register of the 
Charity Commission. We selected the charities that met the following requirements: (a) presence of 
an institutional website; (b) presence of an annual report or a financial statement (financial data of 
2013) published on the Charity Commission’s Register. The year considered for the financial data 
collection is  2013. The analysis, based on econometric techniques, consists of two phases. In the 
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first one we aim to verify the hypotheses about the relationship between the two characteristics of 
governance (CEO duality and board size) and the organizational performance (H1 and H2). Next, 
we analyse if and how our model (and the relationships found) change if the charity increases its 
level of accountability using  voluntary disclosure  tools (H3, H3(a), H3(b), H3(c)). 
VARIABLES AND MODELS 
Our dependent variable, organisational performance, is operationalised as the natural logarithm of 
total revenues in  the fiscal year 2013 (ln_revenues). Financial indicators are often used to measure 
organizational performance in studies of non-profit organisations (Harris, 2014), and the ability to 
collect resources is an important organisational goal (Epstein & McFarlane, 2011). Therefore, 
similar to Grasse, Davis and Ihrke (2014) we consider revenues to be a good measure of 
performance in non-profit organizations.  
Our control variable is the natural logarithm of the charity’s number of human resources, calculated 
as the sum of the number of paid staff and volunteers (ln_hr). This is an organisational-level 
characteristic which allows us to control for size effects. 
Our independent variables are, in the first phase: 
- CEO duality (the position of the CEO and that of the chair or president of the board are 
held by the same person); it is a dummy variable coded 1 if there is duality and 0 if there is 
not  (ceo_duality); 
- board size, calculated as the number of trustees of the board (board_size). 
The independent variables considered in the second phase are: 
- information on volunteers, published on the charities’ websites or reports. It is a dummy 
variable coded 1 if there is information on volunteers published (on the charity’s website or 
reports) and 0 if there is not (volunteers_info); 
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- use of social networks.  It is a dummy variable coded 1 if the charity uses social networks 
and 0 if it does not (soc_network); 
- declared use of a strategic plan. It is a dummy variable coded 1 if the charity has a 
strategic plan and declares to use it and 0 if it does not (strategic_plan). 
We use the natural logarithm of our dependent (total revenues in 2013) and control (number of 
human resources) variables to control the variability and heterogeneity of these quantitative 
variables (see table 2). When examining the variable “board_size”, the data collected show that the 
nonprofit board is almost never “oversized”, indeed 90.50% of the charities in the sample have a 
board size with less than 15 members (see table 3).  
 
Table 2. Summary statistics of quantitative variables 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Revenues (£) 200 2111272      7249464       25190    73355000 
hr 167 174.1377 620.4821 4 5019 
Board_size 200 8.95 4.24708 2 31 
 
 
Table 3. Board size  
Number of board members freq. Percent.  
2-14 181 90.50 
15-31 19 9.50 
Total 200 100.00 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The analysis was conducted using multiple regression models, first in a context of a medium-high 
level of mandatory accountability and following that, when the charities increase their level of 
accountability using tools of voluntary disclosure. Our sample is composed of 200 organizations but 
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the analysis (regression models) was conducted on 167 units because of missing values related to 
the control variable “human resources”. Results are reported in table 4. The constant was omitted 
from our models because it was not significant. Hypothesis 1 predicts that CEO duality has a 
positive impact on organizational performance (measured as its ability in collecting resources, i.e. 
total revenues), in a context characterized by a medium-high level of accountability; while 
according to hypothesis 2, increasing board size has a positive impact on the organizational 
performance (measured as its ability in collecting resources, i.e. total revenues), in a context 
characterized by a medium-high level of accountability that can mitigate the possible negative 
effects considered by the literature on the agency theory. 
 
Table 4. Impact of board size and CEO duality on the organizational performance in charities 
characterized by a medium-high level of mandatory accountability and the effects of the use 
of voluntary disclosure tools 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ln_revenues ln_revenues ln_revenues ln_revenues 
     
ln_hr 2.354*** 2.193*** 1.903*** 1.900*** 
 (0.147) (0.174) (0.172) (0.174) 
board_size 0.350*** 0.359*** 0.278*** 0.278*** 
 (0.0584) (0.0583) (0.0564) (0.0567) 
ceo_duality 2.184*** 2.121*** 1.959*** 1.977*** 
 (0.695) (0.693) (0.645) (0.659) 
volunteers_info  0.939* 0.417 0.411 
  (0.558) (0.528) (0.532) 
soc_network   2.912*** 2.901*** 
   (0.566) (0.573) 
strategic_plan    0.0834 
    (0.572) 
     
Observations 167 167 167 167 
R-squared 0.932 0.934 0.943 0.943 
Standard errors in parentheses 





The first phase of our analysis (Model 1) aims to verify hypotheses 1 (H1) and 2 (H2). The results 
show that both of our hypotheses are supported. Positive and significant associations are found 
between board size and the total revenues (p<0.001) and between CEO duality and the total 
revenues (p<0.001). These results are consistent with the argument that in a context characterized 
by a medium-high level of accountability (as in England & Wales), the accountability tools of 
NPOs reinforce the strength of the board of directors in monitoring the CEO’s activities, and blunt 
one side of the double edged sword related to CEO power (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994).  Our 
control variable, the number of human resources (ln_hr), is highly correlated with the financial 
performance of the organizations.  
The second step of our analysis (Models 2, 3, 4) checks if and how the relations found in the first 
phase change if the charity introduces some tools of “voluntary disclosure”. The relations found in 
the first phase are confirmed also in the second one. In addition, we predicted positive relations 
between the three variables considered (volunteers_info, soc_network, strategic_plan) and the 
ability of the organization to collect resources (ln_revenues). Our hypothesis is partially confirmed: 
the publication of information about the volunteers has a weak positive and significant (p<0.1) 
effect on the ability of the charity to collect resources (see model 2) but the significance of this 
relation disappears in the following analysis (see models 3 and 4), while the declared use of a 
strategic plan seems not to influence the total revenues (ln_revenues). On the contrary, the use of 
social networks has a strong significant (p<0.001) and positive impact on this type of organizational 
performance. This result can be explained by the typology of the variable itself, in particular the use 
of social networks can be seen as a tool that allows beneficiaries, workers, lenders, donors and the 
general public to interact with the charity. Thanks to the use of social networks, such as facebook, 
twitter, blogs, and so on, people can give their opinion about the charity’s activities, can tell their 
experiences, give advice, and participate in the charity’s mission. These results are consistent with 
the study of  Muralidharan et al. (2011) who analysed Facebook and Twitter usage of non-profits 
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during earthquake missions. They found that “Non-profits seem to encourage a steady stream of 
visitors to Facebook and Twitter forming an important means of increasing donations and active 
participation than media organizations”, but, in line with Greenberg and Macaulay (2009), they 
affirm that “Unfortunately, non-profits and media are not utilizing social media to its full potential” 
(Muralidharan et al. 2011). It is, however, important to highlight that maybe the inverse of this 
relationship can also be true.  For example,  Greenberg and Macaulay (2009) affirm that “Even 
though hardware and software expenses continue to decline in relative terms, the costs of 
maintaining and upgrading an organization’s technological infrastructure can be prohibitive, 
particularly for smaller organizations”, this could mean that it is the level of revenues of an 
organization that influences its use of social-networks, rather than the other way around. 
In order to analyse more in depth the qualitative variables considered in this study, we use a 
different methodology of analysis, namely logistic regression. This different technique of analysis 
allows us to verify the level of association between pairs of variables: (a) CEO duality - total 
revenues; (b) information on volunteers - total revenues; (c) the use of social networks - total 
revenues; (d) the declared use of a strategic plan - total revenues. In order to manage and to 
interpret easily the variable “total revenues”, we classified it into four groups by means of the 
quartiles of the distribution [Class 1: total revenues < £ 105217; Class 2: £105218 < total revenues 
< £287548; Class 3: £ 287549 < total revenues < £948138; Class 4: total revenues > £948139]. The 
chi-square test on the association tables between each pair of variables is significant for the 
following associations: (a) ceo_duality and revenues_classes; (c) soc_network and 
revenues_classes; (d) strategic_plan  and  revenues_classes. This motivated to estimate a logistic 











Table 5: Logistic Regressions  
 
(a) Dependent variable: ceo_duality 




Std. Err. z P(z)  (95% Conf. Interval) 
Ceo_duality .4407105 .0760446 -4.75 0.000 .3142524    .6180567 
 
(b) Dependent variable: soc_network 




Std. Err. z P(z)  (95% Conf. Interval) 
Soc_network 1.460565 .2209521 2.50 0.012 1.085806    1.964669 
 
(c) Dependent variable: strategic_plan 
Independent variable: revenues_classes 
 Odds 
Ratio 
Std. Err. z P(z)  (95% Conf. Interval) 
Strategic_plan 2.174183 .3551047 4.76 0.000 1.578597    2.994478 
 
 
The results of table 5 can be interpreted as follows: the level of revenues of organizations is 
associated negatively with the probability to have CEO duality (–56%); positively with the 
probability to have a social network (+46%); and positively with the probability that the charity 
uses and declares to make a strategic plan (+117%). The results as shown  in table 5 indicate that 
the presence of CEO duality is negatively associated with the level of revenues of a charity. If we 
consider the level of revenues as a measure of the charity’s size, we can affirm that in larger 
organizations the probability to have duality is lower than in smaller ones. The results of the logistic 
regression show also that the use of social networks is positively associated with the organization’s 
size, expressed in terms of total revenues. This result confirms the statement of Greenberg and 
Macaulay (2009) according to which for smaller organizations the costs related to  maintaining and 
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upgrading of the social networks can be too expensive, that is the level of revenues of an 
organization can influence its use of social-networks. Finally, the findings in table 5 show that the 
declared use of a strategic plan represents a variable that, even if it seems not to influence the 
revenues in our previous regression models, is strongly associated with the classes of revenues of 
charities, and specifically the declared use of an instrument of strategic planning characterizes the 
largest organizations (in terms of total revenues). This result is consistent with previous studies in 
literature. Stone et al. (1999) in their review of strategic management in non-profit organisations 
found that “ Many nonprofits have not adopted formal strategic planning. For those that do adopt 
formal strategic planning, primary determinants are organization size, characteristics of board and 
of management, prior agreement on organizational goals, and funder requirements to plan”. So the 
organization’s size seems to be a determinant for the decision about the adoption of a strategic plan. 
This result suggests that the recommended practice of the Charity Commission about the 
importance for “larger charities” to set the “charity’s strategic aims and direction”, and to agree 
“appropriate future plans” is widely followed by charities in England & Wales. In order to conclude 
our exploratory analysis on the relationships between the characteristics of governance and 
accountability, we conducted a multiple correspondence analysis and we found that the presence of 
CEO duality is strongly associated with smaller charities, both the presence of social networks and 
the declared use of a strategic plan are associated with larger organizations, while the publication of 
information about volunteers characterizes mainly the organizations of medium-large size. We 
considered the classes of revenues, classified in four groups by means of the quartiles of the 
distribution, as a measure of the organization’s size. Results shown in the following graph are  






Figure 1: Multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) 
 
Note: “S” means “Small charities” with total revenues less than £ 105.217; “M/S” means “Medium/Small 
charities” with total revenues between £105.218 and £287.548; “M/L” means “Medium/Large charities” 
with total revenues between £ 287.549 and £948.138; and  “L” means “Large charities” with total 




The aim of this paper was to understand how mechanisms of accountability can indirectly affect the 
organizational performance, increasing or mitigating, respectively, the positive or negative effects 
in the relationship between board characteristics (board size and CEO duality) and the ability of the 
non-profit organization to collect resources. We predicted that in a context characterized by a 
medium-high level of accountability, the negative effect of CEO duality and larger board size as 
hypothesised by agency theory is not likely to occur since the accountability tools and mechanisms 
are a substitute for board monitoring. To test our hypothesis we referred to the UK third sector 
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context, in particular, England & Wales, because this regulator model represents an example of 
medium-high level of accountability required of charities. We conducted our analysis on a sample 
of 200 charities extracted randomly from the Charity Commission Register, and we found support 
for all our hypotheses; both CEO duality and the board size have a significant positive influence on 
the ability of the charity to collect resources (total revenues). A consecutive phase of our study 
aimed to verify if and how the relations found in the previous step change if the charity increases its 
level of accountability, complementing tools of voluntary disclosure with those mandatory ones 
required by the Charity Commission. The relationships found in the first phase were confirmed also 
in the second one. However, of the three tools of voluntary disclosure that we considered, the use of 
social networks is the variable with the strongest positive and significant effect; the publication of 
information on volunteers has a weak significant and positive effect on total revenues, while the 
declared use of a strategic plan is not significant.  
This study has several important implications both for the regulators of non-profit organizations in 
different countries and for the governing bodies of the non-profit organizations themselves. 
Specifically, the results of this study show that if non-profit organizations work in a context 
characterized by a medium-high level of accountability, as in England & Wales, CEO duality can 
indeed be beneficial for organisational performance in particular contexts. Both boards and 
regulators should therefore pay closer attention to context and avoid ‘one-size-fits all’ prescriptions. 
This study also shows that if the NPO provides voluntarily information about its activities through 
the use of social networks, its ability to collect resources increases. If the organizations provide the 
public with the opportunity to interact with them, to give opinions, to participate to their activities, 
the stakeholders (and the potential donors) would probably feel more involved and confident, and 
therefore more likely to be motivated to contribute with donations to support the organization’s 
mission. Finally, the results of a logistic regression, used to explore how some characteristics of 
charities related to their level of revenues, showed that large charities are more likely to make use of 
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social networks and declare the use of a strategic plan, while it is less probable to encounter CEO 
duality here. These results can help the reader to understand how some qualitative characteristics of 
the NPOs are associated with the organization’s size (measured with the total revenues). Findings of 
the logistic regression are also confirmed by the multiple correspondence analysis that highlights 
the associations between board characteristics and voluntary disclosure considered in this study and 
one variable of the organization’s dimension, the “total revenues” classified into four groups. 
Further research could test for these relationships in other medium-to-high accountability NPO 
contexts (such as Canada and USA); or in countries characterized by a lower level of accountability 
to verify if and how these relationships change. We are aware that the financial measure of total 
revenues could be considered as not completely comprehensive of the ability of the charity to 
collect resources, because there are some resources that are not evaluated or evaluable; in addition it 
represents only one single aspect of the overall performance. Lastly, the different basis of financial 
accounting used by the organizations, cash based (12 charities) and accrual based (188 charities), 
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